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We analyze labour supply behaviour and the choice between formal and informal
sector work of the two partners in two adults families in urban areas in Bolivia,
using cross-section data drawn in 1989. Our model generalizes the neoclassical
family labour supply model. Nonmonetary returns of formal sector employment are
introduced to capture that the choice between formal and informal work is not
exclusively based on wage differentials. The nonlinear system of wage equations
for males and females in the formal and infonnal sector, nonmonetary returns
equations, and labour supply equations for both spouses, are estimated
simultaneously by smooth simulated maximum likelihood.
Among our findings are substantial negative cross wage elasticities of labour
supply. This suggests that families adjust labour supply to opportunities on the
labour market: A low wage of the partner is compensated by working more hours.
We find that lowering formal sector wages would not lead to a fall in participation:
The fall of formal sector employment would be more than offset by a rise in
informal sector participation.
The authors aro gr.tteful to Arie Kapteyn and Joop Hartog for usetul comments. Financial support has
hcxn pmvidr,~l hy thz Nethorlands Organization for Scicntitic Research (NWO) for the first author and
the Royal Nctherlands Ar.uiemy uf Arts anJ Scicncas (KNAW) for thC second author.
Tilburg University, P.O. box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands.2
1. Introduction
We analyze labour supply behaviour of the two partners in two adults families in
urban areas in Bolivia, using cross-section data drawn in 1989. We distinguish four
types of labour supplied by the family: Husband's and wife's hours of work in the
formal sector and in the informal sector. We present a static structural model,
focusing on the relation between these four types of labour supply, their sensitivity
to all four wages, and other family income.
One objective of this study is to see to what extent it is possible for a
household in a developing country, to smooth consumption by reallocating labour
supply of the family. In a developing country, household income is often generated
by more than one member of the household. Poorer families may need more than
one income to reach a level of subsistence. The labour supply decisions of the
individual family members are likely to be correlated. For instance, if earnings of
one family member fall, other family members may increase their labour supply to
compensate for the loss in family income. The combined effect on household
consumption is likely to be less than the initial shock.
The point of departure is a neoclassical family labour supply model. The
family is assumed to take a joint decision regarding household consumption and
labour supply of its members. Its objective is to maximize utility, determined by
household consumption and leisure of all family members, under a household
budget restriction. This approach is used in many studies. For example, Hausman
and Ruud (1984) extend the linear labour supply model to the two adults family
case and apply it to US data. Kapteyn et aL (1990) apply this model to Dutch data.
Ransom (1987) uses a quadratic utility function to analyze labour supply of two
adults households. Newman and Gertler (1991) estimate labour supply of rural
households of varying size in Peru.
We focus on urban labour markets in a developing country. In this context,
it is common practice to distinguish between a"fonnal" and an "informal" sector.
This opens another way in which households can adjust income: If wages fall in
one sector, some individuals may find it advantageous to switch to the other.
During a period of economic malaise with a direct negative effect on formal sector
wages, the informal sector is often seen to expand. This is referred to as the buffer
function of the infonnal sector (Todaro, 1989). We incorporate it in our model.
Previous empirical studies that analyze labour supply in urban areas of a
developing country include Magnac (1991), who extends the basic Roy (1951)
model to analyze earnings in the formal and informal sector in Columbia, and
Gindling (1991), who studied wage determination in the labour market of San José,
Costa Rica. Thomas (1992) provides a recent survey on both theoretical and
empirical studies concerning the informal sector. Our model combines the main
features of Ransom (1987) with those of Magnac (1991).
We will use household survey data from urban areas in Bolivia, drawn in
1989. Our structural approach implies that a new household utility function would3
have to be specified for each type of household.' We therefore limit ourselves to
households with one prime age male and one prime age female, which we refer to
as two adulls households. Some information on the position of these households
among all households in the sample, will be presen[ed in sec[ion 2.
The organization of Ihe paper is as follows: ln section 2 we introduce the
dataset and provide descriptive statistics. In section 3 the model is introduced.
Section 4 contains infortnation on the estimation strategy and the estimation results
are in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
The research is based on data of the second round of the 1989 Bolivian household
survey (Encitesta Integrada de Hogares). The sttrvey uses a random sample of the
urban population and is administered yearly by the Bolivian National Bureau of
Statistics ((nstituto Nacional de Estadística). The 1989 survey covers 7264
households in 8 urban centers. 3712 households contained one prime age male and
one prime age female, with both of them potential workers (between 19 and 65
years old, in good health and not attending full-time education). The defini[ion of
fortnal and infortnal sector is, following Magnac (1991), based on the worker's
status qttestion. Wage workers and independent professionals, such as lawyers and
doctors, are classified as formal, other self-employed workers are classified as
informal. Others, such as family workers or employers are not classified.2 476
households were excluded because one ofthe partners could not be classified, 281
becattse one of the partners had tnore than one job. Finally, 153 households were
exclitded dtte to missing information on one the necessary variables (wages (123
cases), education level, hours worked).'
The sample used for estimation thus contains 2802 families. Table 1 contains
some descriptive statistics. 91 percent of all males is working, against 40 percent of
all females. The majority of males work in the formal sector. The opposite holds
for females. Most individuals participating in the informal sector have little
education; the higher educated are overrepresented in the formal sector.
' Even a reduced ti~rm appruach, as presented in Newman and Gertler (1991), implicitly
makes arhitrary assumptiuns un the relatiuns hetween utility tunctions of families of ditterent
composition.
Z See Pradhan and Van Soest (1992) tiir details on the classification and for sampte statistics
on an individual level.
' For the sample uf 3712 households cunsisting of one prime age female and one prime age
male, average per capita huusehold consumption is 142.8. For the selected sample, it is 136.0.
This suggests that the data cleaning does not lead to serious sample selectivity problems.
Compared to the average in the total survey, per capita income of two adult.e households is about
8 percent lower.4
Table I. Descriptive statistics
(formal and informal sector definition based on worker's status, means and satnple
fractions; standard deviation in parentheses)
male not female not
formal infnrm working formal inform working
highest level uf educatinn attended:
basic 0.22 0.36 0.32 0.10 0.44 0.35
inter 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.16
medio 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.28
middle technical 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.04
higher tech 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
normal 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.02
university 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.04
other 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.10
married 0.96 0.98 0.92 0.96 0.94 0.97
ethnic 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.22 0.48 0.34
age 35.66 37.63 39.58 34.33 35.55 33.06
wage 2.21 2.16 1.90 1.72
(3.16) (2.55) (1.54) (2.29)
hours 52.1 53.6 37.4 45.7
(17.1) (17.8) (16.2) (25.7)
othinc 7.46 4.82 35.66 9.01 5.97 10.94
observations 1755 782 265 423 710 1669
Explanation:
Dummy variahle.c "ha.cic" through "university" denote suhsequent levels of education. Vocational
training ís referred to as "technical". "Nurmal" includes teaehers training tiir primary education.
"Other" includes all uther types uf education.
"married": I if married, 0 otherwise.
"ethnic": 1 if the restxmdent regularly speaks another language than spanish, 0 otherwise.
"othinc": househoW income (Bs per week) excluding earnings.
"hours": working hours per week.
"wage": hourly wage rate (in Bs).'
Ethnic minorities` are found more frequently in the informal sector. Average
other, nonlabour, income is highest for those who do not participa[e. Average
hourly earnings in the formal sector are slighdy higher than in the informal sector.
Average hours worked are higher in the infortnal sector. The hourly earnings
distribution of working males and females in the sample is very similar to that in
'in Bolivianos; At the time uf the survey I Boliviano was worth approximately 0.37 U.S.
dollar. Income taxes Ju nut play an impurtant role. The bulk of government revenues is collec;ted
trough a consumptiun tax.
' Ethnic minorities are identitied thrnugh the language question. If the respondent commonly
speaks anuther language than spanish he ur she is considered to helong to an ethnic minority.5
the original sample of 7264 families.
Table 2 contains some prima facie evidence of intrahousehold effects of labour
supply. We have calculated the average female participation rate and the average
log wage of working females by wage quintile of the male. The female
participation rate is highest in the lower and upper male wage brackets. Yet,
female wages increase with the male's wage. The high participation rate in the
lower quintile could be explained by the low income earned by the male: One
income is not enough to support Ihe family. For the high male wage bracket, the
own wage effect of the fetnale seems to dominate: The high wage she can earn
induces her to work.
Table 2. Female labour supply by male wage quintile (participation rate in
percentages, log female's wage conditional upon working, standard errors in
parentheses)
wagc yuintile ranicip:rtion rate IOb WBbC
RISIC }ClnillC }CfilalC
not working 49.4 0.13
(3.5) (0.07)








5 (rich) 40.G 0.78
(2.2) (0.0G)
3. The model
Since the few individuals with two jobs are removed from the sample, nobody in
the sample works both in tlie formal and in the informal sector. We assume that an
individual can earn a fixed hourly wage in each sector, where the wages in the two
sectors can be different. The simplest assumption then is to assume that the
individual simply chooses the sector with highest hourly earnings. This however is
not necessarily consistent with the data (Magnac, 1991). Unobserved nonmonetary
returns are introduced to explain why people may choose the sector yielding the
lower (monetary) earnings.
As a consequence, three sections of the model can be distinguished. The
labour supply section models the joint labour supply decision of the two spouses.
Labour supply functions are derived on the basis of wage rates, nonlabour income,
and individual taste shiften. The wage rate of each spouse is the maximum of the
wage rates he or she can earn in the fonnal and the informal sector, including6
nonmonetary returns. The second section of the model describes the wage offers in
both sec[ors for both sexes, excluding the unobserved nonmonetary returns. The
third part of the model consists of the nonmonetary returns equations.
Labour sunnlv
The labour supply section of the model is identical to that of Ransom (1987). A
household is characterized by a quadratic direct utility function which has
household consumption and leisure of both partners as arguments. The family
maximizes utility subject to a household budget constraint and nonnegativity
conditions on hours worked:
maz U(2) - a2- ~Z~aZ




Z-~T-h,,,, T-hf C~ "
T: time endowment
h,„, hf hours worked by male and female
C: family consumption
Y: nonlabour income
w,;,, w~: hourly wage of male and female
a E it';Q E 13'`'
(1)
In our case, wage rates are the maximum of formal and infonnal sector wages,
including nonmonetary returns (see below). We assume that the budget constraint is
binding, i.e. that utility increases with C. If neither of the two nonnegativity
conditions on hours are binding, first order conditions can be written as
att~~w.-ai~h,~-a~iw~(wMh~twlhl}n-a~zhj'pi~(2w,~h,~twfhjtntp2iw,~h~ - 0 (2)
~z'a~wj-auhj az~wj(w~h,~'wlhftn-p~zh,~taz~(2wjhr'w~,h~tntP13wjh,~ - U 131
The a's are a fimction of a, a and the time endowment. See Ransom (1987) for
details. The quadratic specification implies that it is not necessary to specify the
time endowment. Following Ransom, we allow a; and aZ to be a function of
observed taste shifters Q,; and unobserved taste shifters er; (k-1,2), where the
subscript i denotes the household:
If one of nonnegativity constraints becomes binding and one of the partners dces7
ak - Q~.rktE~.
E li
k-1,2 E~ - E~-N(O,E)
EZi
(4)
not work, one of the first order conditions changes into an inequality condition.
This resulls in a simultaneous nx~del of two tobit equations. Due to the quadratic
utility fimction, the underlying latent model is linear. See Ransom (1987) for
details.
Waees
The log of the hourly wage in both sectors is modeled as a linear function of
exogenous variables and an error term:
ln (w~.)-XkTw.trtk~ rlk~-N(O,a~) j-1,2 for formal and informal
k-1,2 for male andfemale
(5)
For ease of notation we have dropped the index i as we shall continue to do in the
rest of the paper. We use separate wage equations to describe earnings in both
sectors for both sexes. The error terms are assumed to be independent of each
other and of the random preference terms in [he labour supply section of the
model.
Nonmonetary returns
Under the assumption of homogeneous preferences and free movement between
sectors all individuals participate in the sector in which the wage offer is the
highest. This is the assumption in the classical Roy (1951) model. However,
individuals not necessarily participate in the sec[or with the highest wage offer.
Two effects can be distinguished. On the one hand, demand factors may limit
movement between sectors. In particular, the view that entrance into the formal
sector is restricted is wide spread (see Fields 1975). On the other hand, preferences
for sectors may differ across individuals. For example, apart from wages, larger
freedom in the informal sector or larger job security in the formal sector may be
considered. We capture such effects under nonmonetary returns (NMR) to the job.
This is the monetary equivalent of all nonwage factors that inFluence sec[or
participation. Magnac (1991) assumes homogeneous preferences for sectors and
interpre[s nonmonetary returns as rationing.
We model nonmonetary returns as a fraction of the monetary wage. Only the
difference in nomnonetary returns between sectors is identified because we do not
observe reservation wages. We normalize infonnal nonmonetary returns to zero.
The log of the (formal sector) nonmonetary returns NMR, (k-1 (male), 2(female)
are written as a function of individual characteristics, local labour market
condítions and an error tenn:
We assume that each individual chooses the sector with highest wage offer,8
ln (NMR tl)-V t NO,oZ k kYk ~k Wk~ ( k)
including nonmonetary returns. For the formal sector the wage is
w;A-(NMR~tI)w,,. For the informal sector, [he wage offer itself enters because
non-monetary returns equal zero. With probability one, the wage offers will be
different, so that the indívidual chooses one sector only.
The complete model thus consists of eight equations: two wage equations for each
sex, one nonmonetary returns equation for each sex, and two labour supply
equations. Nole that the labour supply section of the model is modelled in terms of
hourly wages, while in the second section of the model wages and nonmonetary
returns are modellecl in logs, so that the model as a whole is nonlinear.
The model is an improvement on the Ransom (1987) model in that the wage
equations are incorporated and estimated joindy with the labour supply equations.
Ransom predicted wage offers for nonparticipants using a separate model, thus
ignoring wage rate prediction errors. Furthermore, we distinguish between two
sectors. The model also generalizes the one presented in Magnac (1991): We
follow a more structural approach, and consider not only participation but also
hours worked. Moreover, while Magnac considers individuals, we work on the
household level and analyze intra household interactions.
4. Estimation
Due to its nonlinear nature, the model cannot be estimated by maximum likelihood.
Exact likelihood contributions would be too hard to compute at each step of the
maximization process. Instead, we maximize an approximation of the likelihood,
based upon simulations of some of the errors in the wage and nonmonetary returns
equations. This method is an example of smooth simulated maximum likelihood
(cf. Bcersch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993), for example). We only describe the
main idea here. Details can be found in the appendix.
If, for a given family, both partners are working and w,;, and w~ are known,
the likelihood contribution of the labour supply part of the model (conditional on
wages) is identical to that in Ransom (1987). We denote it by L,(h~„hr: w,;,.wr). To
keep notation simple, we suppress the other arguments it depends on (taste shifters,
other family income). The complete likelihood contribution is then given by
L(hu~fhns~~nsnw~ufwr) - Li(h„~fhri w„nwr) 1-u(s~ufwu~ Lm(srfwrJ (7)
Here L„ and L,,, are the likelihood contributions of the wage and nonmonetary
returns equations for male and female,respectively. s~, and sf are the observed
sectors of male and female. Because of the linearity of this part of the model and
independence assumptions of the errors, L„ and L.,,, can easily be computed. It
factors out into a contribution of the male and a contribution of the female, both
similar to Magnac's (1991) likelihood. In this case therefore, the likelihood9
contribution can be written down exactly.
This is only relevant however, if both partners work in the informal sector.
lf either of them does not participate or works in the fonnal sector, his or her
relevant wage is not observed. In case of nonparticipation, this is the familiar
problem in estimating structural labour supply models with unobserved wage rates
(cf. MaCurdy et al (1990), for example). In case of formal sector work, we
observe the monetary wage, but we must include nonmonetary returns which are
always unobserved. Let us assume that male and female both work in the formal
sector. The likelihood contribution can now be written as
L(h~~~hns~~~~sr~w~~~Wr) - E{Li(h~~nhr;W~„~wr)1-u(s~„~w~„)1-~rn(sr,wr)} (8)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the unobserved errors in the
nonmonetary returns equations, linking the observed w,,, and wc to the unobserved
wm and w~. See appendix for details. This expecta[ion cannot be compu[ed
analytícally, because Li is a complicated nonlinear function of w,;, and w~. It is
therefore replaced by a simulated mean:
I-u(h~~~~hns~~~~snw~~ewr)-(1IEnE~ -~{Lr(h~~~~hr~w~~~.;~wr)1-n(s~~nw~~~;)Lm(snwr~)} (9)
where w,;,~ and w~~ (j-1,...,H) result from adding H independent draws of the
errors in the NMR equations to the observed fonnal sector wages.
This procedure is easily generalized to other cases. For those individuals
who do not participate, we draw all the errors in the wage and nonmonetary
returns eyuations. The maximum wage offer from the two sectors is substituted in
the labour supply part of the model. This type of nonlinearity was also solved
trough simulation by Laroque and Salanie (1989) for a disequilibrium model. The
satnple log likelihood is replaced by an approximate loglikelihood, replacing each
likelihood contribution by its simulated approximation. The simulated maximum
likelihood (SML) estimator maximizes the approximate sample loglikelihood.
The estimator is consistent if both the number of observations N and the
number of draws per observation H go to infinity. Moreover, if draws for different
observations are independent, the estimator is asymptotically efficient if fNIH gces
to zero (Gourieroux and Monfort 1993). Because the errors in the labour supply
part of the model are retained and not simulated, the approximate likelihood is a
continuous and differentiable function of the parameters. This makes maximization
feasible and, according to previous studies on similar models (Boersch-Supan and
Hajivassiliou, 1993, for example), should lead to acceptable results for small values
of H already. We use H-30".
' Pradhan (1993) tinds ti~r a similar mudel that turther increasing the number of draws hardly
changes the results.10
5. Estimation Results
We first present the estimates of the labour supply model, equations (I) through
(4). The estimates of I', and I',, detennining a; and a:, are in table 3. A higher
value of a' is associated with a higher propensity to work, since cY is a negative
function of a. Exogenous variables included in Q~ (k-1,2) refer to family
composition and age. The number of children in the household (YOUNG)
significantly increases the propensity to work for males and has the opposite effect
for fetnales. The number of older persons in the hottsehold (OLD) is insignificant.
A quadratic age pattern is significant for both tnales and fetnales.' The propensity
to work is highest at age 33 for males and at age 42 for females. There is a
significant negative correlation between the two random preference terms
indicating, ceteris pnribus, a tendency towards specialization.











age squarcxl~100 -2.173 -4.592
(0.471) (1.145)
02 9.117 7.068 v,: (E1z) -1.944
(0.416) (2.077) (0.802)
The estimates for the matrix ~3 are presented in table 4. To nonnalize the scale of
the utility function, we have set Q„ equal to one, following Ransom (1987). All
estimated coefficients are significant. The marginal utility of leisure increases with
additional leisure of the partner. Moreover, marginal utility of both partners
increases with family consumption.
In writing down the first order conditions (2)-(3), we do not take account of
the possibility that an interior point of the bodget set is chosen. It is thus assumed
that the utility function increases with family consumption. According to our
results, this is the case for 2757 out of 2802 observations. The 45 remaining
observations are discarded in the simttlations below. If utility increases with family
consumption, the solution of the Lagrange equations (equalities and inequalities)
corresponds to the utility maximum if the utility function is quasiconcave. Positive
definiteness of a is a sufficient but not a necessary condition. Since our estimate of
~ a; and a; Jepend un the male's and female's age, respectively.11
(3 is not positive definite, we checked concavity conditions for all observations. It
appears that they are satisfied without exception."
Table 4. Estimates for Q matrix (standard errors in parentheses)
malC IeisurC fCmalc Icisurn consumption (I10)
male leisura 1
femalC leisure -0.2G2 0.414
(O.OS4) (0.088)
consumption(I10) -0.340 -0.326 0.0178
(0.057) (0.055) (0.0029)
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the shape of the labour supply curves. Figure 1 shows
unconditional supply cttrves, i.e. predicted ntttnbers of hours worked (divided by
10) for males and females as a function of both partners' wages (including
nonmonetary returns).y a; and cx- are set equal to their sample means (a;-4.1,
a:--1.7), random preferences are set equal to zero. Male labour sttpply is forward
bending in most of the range of male wages, and backward bending for very high
wage rates, where the income effect dominates the substitution effect. If w; is low,
the female does not work, and male hours depend on w,;, only. If the female works,
male hours are negatively affected by the female's wage. The female's hours of
work increase with her own wage and decrease with [he husband's wage.
Figure 2 shows the probability of participation for both males and females as
a function of their own wage and the nttmber of hours worked by the partner
(divided by 10). The wage of the partner and all family characteristics are kept at
the mean predicted value. Random preferences are taken into account. For females,
the own wage effect on the probability of working is positive. The effect is
stronger if the male works fewer hours. The effect of the husband's wage on the
wife's hours is small, and its sign depends on the female's wage. Only for high
wages of the fetnale, this effect is substantially negative. For the fatnily the graph
refers to, the probability that the male works is always higher than 0.95. There is a
slight positive own wage effect and a negligible effect of the female's hours on this
probability.
The estimates of the wage equations and the non-monetary return equation
for both sexes are presented in table AI in the appendix. In the wage equations we
have included individual characteristics such as age, education level and ethnicity,
and variables describing local labour market conditions such as the local
unemployment rate and a measure for the size of the economically active
" This also implies that the mudel is wherent, in the sense that endogenous variables are
uniquely determined (cf. Van Suest et al., 1993).
a Estimated sample averages uf wages including nonmunetary returns are 6.6 for males and
3.0 for females.12
population, as a proxy for the size of the local labour market. The specification is
similar to that in Pradhan and Van Soest (1992), and so are the results. For
example, returns tu educatiim ar~ larger in the fi~rmal sector than in the informal
sector. This may indicate that the formal sector requires skills obtained trough the
formal education system or that education is used as a screening device in the
formal sector. A larger local labour market generally leads to a higher wage. The
effect is significant for tnales in the formal sector and for females in the informal
sector. The significantly negative effect of the local unemployment rate is largest in
the informal sector. This can be explained by the fact [hat the informal sector is
more competitive than the formal sector. In the formal sector, ethnic minorities are
paid significantly less than others.
In the nonmonetary return equations for fonnal sector employment, we have
included the variables of the wage equations and two taste shifters: the numbers of
young and old persons in the family. Nonmonetary returns may result from demand
side constraints (rationing) or from individual preferences concerning sector
participation. For both male and females we find that "normal" education (primary
school teachers) has positive nomnonetary returns. People with this type of training
attach a higher status to teaching in a primary school, which is exclusively formal,
to informal sector work. If one assumes that preferences do not depend on
ethnicity, the negative ccefficient on "ethnic" can be interpreted as an indicator of
relatively high job search costs for ethnic minorities for formal sector jobs or,
discrimination. The number of young children increases preference for ínformal
sector jobs. Perhaps this is because of higher flexibility of when and how much to
work in the informal sector. Maybe also, additional income can be generated in the
informal sector by child labour. The hypothesis of weakly competitive markets (all
parameters in nonmonetary returns equation equal zero) as defined by Magnac
(1991), is clearly rejected for both males and females.'o
Simulations
To see how well the model predicts the distribution of hours worked and sector
participation, we present figure 3 and table 5. For all observations in the sample
we have simulated wages, nonmonetary returns, and the number of hours worked,
taking one draw from the distribution of the error terms. [n the top and bottom
panel of figure 3, the predicted and actual sample distribution of hours worked are
shown, respectively. Note that the scale of the vertical axis varies per graph.
Actual hours distributions for males are peaked at 40 and 48 hours per week.
These peaks are not fitlly reproduced by the predictions. This would require a
model incorporating restrictions on hours worked, as in Dickens and Lundberg
(1993). For females, the distribution of both actual and predicted hours worked is
more dispersed.
In table 5 we present a cross tabulation of [he sector in which husband and
'o Wald te,ets statistics are 230 and 580, exceeeling critical values of X;,, for any sensible
significance level.13
wife participate." We compare actual and predicted numbers. The model
underpredicts the number of nonparticipants. This is particularly serious for males.
Possible explanations may be fixed costs of working or a lack of available part-time
jobs. The ratios of fonnal and informal sector par[icipation rates are predic[ed with
reasonable accuracy.
Table 5. cross tabulation of sector participation for male and female (actual and
predicted, percentages)
femalc;~ formal informal no[-working total
malell aciual OreJ actual rreJ actual prrAi actual pred
formal II.I 10.0 12.0 17.0 39.7 39.9 62.8 66.9
informal 2.7 4.8 9.0 9.5 16.0 15.3 27.6 29.7
not working 1.4 1.3 3.4 0.8 4.9 1.4 9.6 3.5
total I5.1 16.1 24.4 27.3 60.5 56.7 100 100
In Table 6 we present the resttlts of some simulation exercises. The objective
of the first two sirntrlations is to exarnine the importance of intra-household effects.
We first simttlate the labour sttpply response of a 10 percent drop of wage rates for
all males. This has hardly any effect on the average nutnber of hours the male
works. Participation of males slightly decreases. Labour sttpply of the females
however, shows a stronger response: Her average number of hours worked
increases by 3.0 percent, corresponding to a cross labour supply elasticity of -0.3.
A closer look at the own labour supply response for males reveals that the
low elasticity is not ttniforrn over the sample. Males with a positive labour supply
response are those who initially had a high wage. For most males with a low wage,
the labour supply response to a wage decrease is negative. This corresponds with
the inverted U shape of the labour supply curve shown in figure 2.
The second simulation concerns a lOqo decrease of wage rates of females.
This has only a very small effect on hours worked by males and females. Male
hours increase and female hours decrease, but both effects are less than one
percent. To get some insight in aggregate income elasticities, we also performed a
simulation in which nonlabour income increased by 10 percent for all households.
For IS percent of the households this does not have any effect, since their non-
labour income was zero to start with. The effects were quite small. For both males
and females, hours worked decrease slightly. [ncome elasticities are 0.005 for
males and 0.012 for females.
A main objective of this paper is to see how well a family can counter an
exogenous shock in income by adjusting hours worked and by switching between
sectors. Therefore, we simulated a fall in all formal sector wages by 10 percent.
" Tahles S thruugh 7 are haseil un the 2757 ohservations fur which utility increates with
family consumptiun.14
See tables 6 and 7. There is a strong direct effect on the income of the majority of
males employed in the fonnal sector. 2.3 percent of males switch from the formal
to the informal sector, while the participation rate for males remains the same.
Labour force participation of females increases by 0.4 percent. This is a result of
two opposite effects: An increase due to reduced partner's earnings (cf. previous
simulation), and a decrease due to the fall of the own (formal sector) wage. The
average number of hours worked increase for both males and females. Labour
supply of males inereases because fonnal sector workers are generally in the higher
income brackets. The size of the informal sector increases by 5.9 percent. This
prediction should be viewed as an upper limit, since a fall in formal sector wage
offers will often be accompanied by a fall in infonnal sector wages.
Table 6. Simulations (sample averages and changes of sample averages, s[andard
errors in parentheses'', wage and income excluding nonmonetary returns)
actual prulicteJ wage mala wage female formal wage
-IOí~ -10~ -109b
mean 0 ~ 0
wage offer male 2.05 -0.205 0 -0.135
(0.04) (0.004) (O.OOS)
wage offer fzmale I.48 0 -0.148 -0.OSI
(0.04) (0.004) (0.004)
hours male 47.10 46.93 -0.034 O.IS6 0.120
(O.SS) (0.040) (0.015) (0.031)
~ero working 90.40 96.44 -0.208 0.144 -0.009
(0.30) (0.081) (0.072) (0.076)
hours female 16.10 16.86 0.458 -0.129 0.306
(0.77) (0.043) (0.032) (0.035)
~erc working 59.50 43.33 0.902 -0.838 0.419
(1.03) (0.191) (0.177) (0.171)
household incotne 126.30 130.95 -S.S81 -2.688 -6.285
(2.23) (0.227) (O.IS2) (0.278)
'Z Based on 300 draws from estimated asymptutic distribution of estimator of ~.is
Table 7. Simulated Sector participation rates after l0 percent drop formal sector
wage (percentages, standard errorsin parentheses)
m:JC fcmalc
twf~irc aticr heti~rc after
mran ~ mcan 0
formal 66.8 -2.23 16.0 -0.74
(0.95) (0.25) (0.80) (0.18)
infonnal 29.6 2.22 27.3 I.IS
(0.93) (0.25) (1.07) (0.19)
not working 3.6 0.01 56.7 -0.42
(0.29) (0.08) (1.03) (0.17)
6. Conclusions
We have analyzed laboor supply behaviour and the choice between formal and
informal sector work of the two spouses in two adults families in urban areas of
Bolivia. For this purpose, we have developed a static neoclassical model,
combining the family labour supply model of Ransom (1987) with the model
explaining sector choice and earnings of Magnac (1991). Our main empirical
conclusion is that intra-household effects are substantial: low earnings of the
husband are compensated by more working hours of the wife. Second, we find that
a wage shock in the formal sector induces people to move to the informal sector,
while the effec[ on nonparticipation is much smaller. Third, we find that
nonmonetary returns in the formal sector are usually positive. This implies that, on
average, if formal and informal sector wage are equal, people prefer a formal
sector job. It can be explained by differences in job characteristics. This finding is
different from that of Magnac (1991), who finds that nonmonetary returns are
insignificant.
Although our model captures some features of the data quite well, a
simulation makes clear that it is not fillly capable to reproduce the data. In
particular, nonparticipation of males and, to a lesser extent, of females is
underpredicted. Allowing for fixed costs of working or taking account of
constraints on hours worked, might help to overcome this problem. The quadratic
specification of the utility function, together with the estimation method of smooth
simulated maximum likelihood, make these extensions feasible areas of future
research.16
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Exnlanatii~n tahle A I un nex[ : ~ i"~
Êducatiun level is incurp~irated ae ti~ll~~ws: Firs[, dummies are us~d tu indicate the highest level of
cuurses atten~led. Secund, fi~r th~ise wh~i did nin cumplete the wurse, we used the deviation
hetween the level attained and the level if c~nnpleted, exrrestied in years ("miss years"). This
deviation is zeru if the cuurse iti tinished and negative utherwise.
Cf. tahle I tiir the uther variahles.ablz AI. estitnated coefficients for wage equations and non-monetary retum equations (standard errors in parentheses)
~le female
formal informal nmr fortnal informal omr
cnst -I.334 0.649 2.399 -2.069 -0.820 -2.055
(0.281) (0.384) (0.372) (0.649) (0.514) (0.944)
agz 0.710 0.101 -0.124 0.808 0.429 I.109
(0.137) (0.168) (0.206) (0.318) (0.239) (0.502)
age squarzd -0.771 -0.083 -0.259 -0.967 -0.483 -1.441
(0.177) (0.202) (0.269) (0.410) (0.299) (0.647)
intzr 0.167 -0.059 -0.241 OS~3 0.177 0.365
(0.060) (0.076) (0.089) (0.129) (0.103) (0.202)
mzdio 0.351 0.168 0.182 O.Sl2 0.210 0.395
(0.0~1) (0.070) (0.072) (0.119) (0.09I) (0.192)
midtzch 0.664 0.206 -0.049 1.120 0.172 1.000
(0.110) (0.172) (0.196) (0.142) (0.204) (0.217)
hightzch 0.784 0.311 -0.046 1.165 0.688 1.448
(0.126) (0.223) (0.209) (0.225) (0.264) (0.264)
normal 0.581 -0.375 0.273 1.280 -0.068 2.311
(0.105) (0.175) (0.131) (0.126) (0.254) (0.182)
univzrsíh~ 1.181 0.099 -0.159 1.767 0.326 1.I30
(0.062) (0.102) (0.094) (0.134) (0.177) (0.208)
othzr 0.583 -0.190 0.347 0.016 -0.253 -0.377
(0.091) (0.170) (0.098) (0.169) (0.124) (0.283)
miss yzars 0.068 0.027 -0.001 0.123 0.013 O.I21
(0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.027) (0.049)
uon act 0.144 0.041 -0.226 0.089 0.199 -0.010
(0.029) (0.044) (0.044) (0.055) (0.054) (0.075)
unzmpl -0.630 -1.211 -0.351 -0.568 -0.918 -0.507
(0.121) (0.173) (O.I62) (0.226) (0.219) (0.308)
ethnic -0.160 -0.031 -0.220 -0.210 0.041 -0.291
(0.044) (0.060) (0.060) (0.091) (0.078) (0.134)
young -0.059 -0.088
(O.Ol7) (0.037)
old -0.083 -0. l42
(0.080) (0.136)
a 0.751 0.798 1.086 0.684 0.904 1.113
(0.010) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.054)Appendix: Simulated Likelihood Contributions
The likelihood contributions consist of three parts, L,, L,,, and L,,,, as introduced in (7).
L., is the contribution of the labour supply sec[ion of the model, for given wages w,;, and
wf of males and females. The expression for L, is given in Ransom (1987). L~ and L,,,
reflect the likelihood contributions of wage equations and nonmonetary returns, for males
and females, respectively. Because males and females are treated identically in the model,
L„ and L,,, are similar. We first consider the male and look at L,,.
If the male works in the formal sector, wm is observed, but w,;, is not, because of
the nonmonetary returns. If p,,, the error in the NMR equation, were known, the
likelihood contribution of this section of the model would be given by
~w,J~v~r~'v~-Y,~u
L~(W,) - J Í(nia~rl~Rn„) (A1)
where f denotes the (normal) p.d.f. of r11z and rl„ resp. L„(p,) is thus easy to compute.
If the male works in the infotmal sector, we observe w,;,. Nonmonetary returns in
the informal sector aze zero. The likelihood contribution equals
~,~d-X~~~~-Y~y~
Lu - f liPit~lu) d(Wi}rlii).ICn,~ (A2)
If the male dces not participate, we don't know whether the informal or the fotmal
sector wage is relevant, and we must condition on n,,, n12 and ~,. Lll equals 1 and
vanishes. The wage that enters into L, equals
wm(~11,~12,i~1)-exP(max(3CITI1 tnll f Vltil fIII,XITUfnlz))- (A3)
I,,,, is calculated in a similar way. The full likelihood contribution of the family is given
by the expectation of the product of L,, I,,, and L,,,, with respect to the error tetms that
we conditioned on. For example, if the husband works in the formal sector and the wife
dces not participate, the exact likelihood contribution is given by
~l'hn,`Y,sm,~vm) -
- 1 ~(hm,hf;wm(Frl),wr(Tlz,,rÍu,l~)~I(l~l)f(ih,nxl,nu,liz)dF~ldrizldrizzdkl (A4)
where f denotes the (normal) p.d.f of (~,,n,,,rlZZ,~). The four dimensional integral in
(A4) cannot be computed analytically, because L, is a complicated nonlinear function of
w,;, and w~. It is therefore replaced by a simulated mean:
~(hm,hr,sm,Wm)-(llH)Ej~I{LI(hm,hr;wm(Izlt),~vt(nzl;,nzz;,lht))I-II(F~I,) (AS)
where (W,~,nZ,~,nZ2~,W2~), j-1,...,H, are i.i.d. draws from the distribution of (p,,qZ,,,}u,~).
Other cases aze treated in a similar way. The integral to be replaced varies from six
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